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Abstract
Countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth win-
ners. We claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is diﬀerences
in the quality of institutions. More natural resources push aggregate income down,
when institutions are grabber friendly, while more resources raise income, when in-
stitutions are producer friendly. We test this theory building on Sachs and Warners
inßuential works on the resource curse. Our main hypothesis: that institutions are
decisive for the resource curse, is conÞrmed. Our results are in sharp contrast to the
claim by Sachs and Warner that institutions do not play a role.
Keywords: Natural resources, Institutional quality, Growth, Rent-seeking
JEL: O4, Q0, F43
1 Introduction
One of the important empirical Þndings in development economics in the 20th cen-
tury is that natural resource abundant economies have tended to grow slower than
economies without substantial resources (Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997a,b, Auty
2001). For instance, the Asian tigers: Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore,
are all resource-poor, while growth losers, such as Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra Leone,
Angola, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, are all resource-rich. On average resource
abundant countries lag behind countries with less resources.1
Yet this should not lead us to jump directly to the conclusion that there is a
resource curse. Also many growth winners are rich in resources such as Botswana,
Canada, Australia, and Norway. Moreover, of the 82 countries included in a World
Bank study Þve countries belong both to the top eight according to their natural
capital wealth and to the top 15 according to per capita income (World Bank 1994).
To explain these diverging experiences we investigate whether growth winners
and growth losers diﬀer systematically in their institutional arrangements. By fo-
cusing on the role of institutions we follow the seminal contributions by North and
Thomas (1973), Knack and Keefer (1995), Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2000), and Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) that all insist on the decisive role of institu-
tions for economic development. Inspired by their ideas we claim that the variance
of growth performance among the resource rich countries is primarily due to how
resource rents are distributed. Some countries have institutions that favor producers
in the distribution of the resource rents, while others have institutions that favor
unproductive grabbers.
Clearly, our point is not the presence of rent-seeking or not most countries have
various sorts of such activities. The distinction we make is between producer friendly
institutions, where rent-seeking and production are complimentary activities, and
grabber friendly institutions, where rent-seeking and production are competing ac-
tivities. Grabber friendly institutions therefore easily divert scarce entrepreneurial
resources out of production and into unproductive activities as a result of natural
1This is documented in Gelb (1988), Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997a,b), Lane and Tornell
(1996), and Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega (1999). Stijns (2002), however, argues that these
results are less robust than the authors claim.
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resource abundance.
With grabber friendly institutions there are gains from specialization in various
sorts of unproductive inßuence activities, while there are extra costs of production
activities due to discretionary power and favoritism. Typical features of grabber
friendly institutions are a weak rule of law and a high risk of expropriation, mal-
functioning bureaucracy and corruption in the government.
Our main hypothesis contrasts the rent seeking approach that Sachs and Warner
(1995) considered but dismissed. Their speciÞc mechanism asserted that resource
abundance lead to a deterioration of institutional quality, which in turn would lower
growth. Sachs and Warner found that this hypothesis was empirically unimportant,
reverting to the Dutch disease explanation as the empirically relevant one. However,
the lack of evidence for the proposition that resource abundance causes institutional
decay, is not suﬃcient to dismiss the rent extraction story altogether as Sachs and
Warner seem to do.
The presence of rich natural resources in a country may not in itself cause insti-
tutional decay, but may nevertheless put the institutional arrangements to a test.
We claim that it is the combination of resource abundance and institutional quality
that matters. In countries with producer friendly institutions rich resources attract
entrepreneurs into production that cause higher growth. In countries with grabber
friendly institutions and resource abundance, however, entrepreneurs are diverted
away from production and into unproductive extraction implying a lower growth
rate.
Our claim is consistent with observations from several countries. Botswana,
where forty percent of GDP stems from diamond revenues has had the worlds
highest growth since 1965. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) attribute the
good performance to good institutions. Indeed, Botswana has the best African
score on the Groningen Corruption Perception Index. Norway has a long history
of favoring productive enterprises and is among the least corrupt countries in the
world. Norway was Europes poorest country in 1900, but is now one of the richest.
The transition was natural resource led, starting with timber, Þsh and hydroelectric
power and continuing with oil and natural gas.
Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) explain the disappointing
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economic performance following signiÞcant oil windfalls in Nigeria, Venezuela and
Mexico by dysfunctional institutions that invite grabbing. Even more stark exam-
ples of grabber friendly conditions can be found in countries where the government
is unable to provide basic security. In these countries resource abundance stimulate
violence, theft, and looting, by Þnancing rebel groups, warlord competition (Skaper-
das 2002), or civil wars. In their study of civil wars Collier and Hoeﬄer Þnd that
the extent of primary commodity exports is the largest single inßuence on the risk
of conßict(2000 p. 26). The consequences for growth can be devastating. F. Lane
argues the most weighty single factor in most periods of growth, if any one factor
has been most important, has been a reduction in the resources devoted to war
(1958 p. 413).
In support of our claim we discuss a simple model and test its basic predictions.
Our model has implications that diﬀer from earlier models of the resource curse.
Dutch disease models, like those by van Wijnbergen (1984), Krugman (1987) and
Sachs and Warner (1995) predict a monotonic relationship between resources and
growth (see Torvik 2001 for a discussion of the Dutch disease models). Existing
models explaining the resource curse with rent-seeking, such as those of Lane and
Tornell (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999) and Torvik (2002) also predict a monotonic
relationship between resource abundance and income. These models explain impor-
tant aspects of the resource curse, but they do not explain why resource abundance
retards growth in some countries but not in others. Our model, however, predicts
that there is a resource curse only for countries with bad institutions.
In order to test our models implications we build on Sachs and Warner (1997a),
whose result that natural resource abundance negatively aﬀects growth has earlier
been shown to be rather robust when controlling for other factors (see Sachs and
Warner 1995, 1997a,b, 2001). We extend these growth regressions by allowing for
the growth eﬀects of natural resources to depend on the quality of institutions. Our
main Þnding is that the resource curse applies in countries with grabber friendly
institutions, but not in countries with producer friendly institutions.
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2 The model
Our main concern is the allocation of entrepreneurs between grabbing and produc-
tion. The total number of entrepreneurs in the economy is denoted by N = nP +nG,
where nP are producers while nG are grabbers. Grabbers target rents from natural
resources R and use all their capacity to appropriate as much as possible of this rent.
To what extent grabbing succeeds depends on the institutions of the country. In the
model the institutional quality is captured by the parameter λ, which reßects the
degree to which the institutions favors grabbers versus producers. When λ = 0, the
system is completely grabber friendly such that grabbers share the entire rent, each
of them obtaining R/nG. The higher is λ, the more producer friendly the system.
When λ = 1, the system is completely neutral in the sense that both grabbers and
producers each obtain nothing more than their fair share R/N . Formally λ measures
the resource rents accruing to each producer relative to that accruing to a grabber.
The pay-oﬀ to each grabber, πG, is a factor, s, times the fair share
πG = sR/N (1)
while the producers share of the resource rent is λsR/N . The factor s is decreasing
in λ since each grabber gets less the more producer friendly the institutions. There
is also a positive eﬀect on s from less competition between grabbers. Hence, s is an
increasing function of the fraction of producers α = nP/N and a decreasing function
of the institutional parameter λ. When no resources are directly destroyed in the
contest without waste, the sum of shares of the resource rent that accrues to each
group of entrepreneurs is equal to one. Hence, the following constraint must hold
(1− α) s+ λαs = 1 (2)
It follows directly from (2) that the only function s that implies no waste is simply
s (α,λ) =
1
(1− α) + λα (3)
In fact, s (α,λ) is a much used function in the rent seeking literature.
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The proÞts of a producer, πP , is the sum of proÞts from production, π, and the
share of the resource rents λsR/N. Hence,
πP = π + λs (α,λ)R/N (4)
In order to determine proÞts from production, π, we now turn to the produc-
tive part of the economy where we follow Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishnys (1989)
formalization of Rosenstein-Rodans (1943) idea about demand-complementarities
between industries.
There are L workers and M diﬀerent goods; each good can be produced in a
modern Þrm or in a competitive fringe. In the fringe the Þrms have a constant
returns to scale technology where one unit of labor produces one unit of the good.
Hence, the real wage in the fringe and the equilibrium wage of the economy is also
one. A modern Þrm, however, produces y applying an increasing returns to scale
technology.
Each modern Þrm is run by one entrepreneur and requires a minimum of F
units of labor. Labor in excess of F each produces β > 1 units of output. Hence,
the marginal cost is 1/β < 1. Assuming equal expenditure shares in consumption,
inelastic demand and Bertrand price competition it follows that: (i) all M goods
have a price equal to one and are produced in equal quantities y. Hence total
production isMy. (ii) each good is either produced entirely by the fringe or entirely
by one single modern Þrm. To see this, observe that the fringe can always supply
at a price equal to one. Price competition a la Bertrand implies that the price is
set just below the marginal cost of the second most eﬃcient competitor. A single
modern Þrm in an industry only competes against the fringe and the price is set
equal to one. If a second modern Þrm enters the same industry competition drives
the price down to 1/β, implying negative proÞts for both. Hence, only one modern
Þrm will enter each branch of industry.
ProÞts from modern production are therefore
π =
µ
1− 1
β
¶
y − F (5)
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Total income Y consists of resource rents, R, in addition to the value added in
production, yM . Total income Y is also equal the sum of wage income, L, and
proÞts
Y = N (απP + (1− α)πG) + L (6)
Inserting from (1) and (11) it follows that
Y = R+My = L+R+ nPπ (7)
Combining with (5), we solve for y to get2
y =
β (L− nPF )
β (M − nP ) + nP (8)
In an economy without modern Þrms, total income is equal to L + R. Completely
industrialized (nP = αN =M) total income of the economy equals β(L−MF )+R.
We assume that the modern technologies are eﬃcient implying that the income in
a modernized economy is higher than in a backward economy:
L+R < β(L−MF ) +R ⇐⇒ β > L
(L−MF ) (9)
We also assume that N < M , so that the economy always beneÞts from more
productive entrepreneurs. By inserting from (8) in (5) it follows that π can be
written as a function of the number of productive entrepreneurs
π = π (nP ) (10)
2Assuming that the natural resource R consists of the same basket of goods that are previously
produced in the economy, or (more realistic) that the natural resource is traded in a consumption
basket equivalent to the one the country already consumes. This simpliÞes the analysis as pro-
duction of all goods will be symmetric as in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). For analysis of
demand composition eﬀects of natural resources, the cornerstone in the Dutch disease literature,
see for example van Wijnbergen (1984), Krugman (1987), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Torvik
(2001). For rent-seeking models with demand composition eﬀects, see Baland and Francois (2000)
and Torvik (2002).
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Figure 1: Resources and rent seeking
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We can show that as a result of (9) π (nP ) is everywhere positive and increasing
in the number of producers nP = αN . When also including their fraction of the
resource rents total proÞts for a producer are
πP = π (αN) + λs (α,λ)R/N (11)
Or equivalently, using (1),
πP = π (αN) + λπG (12)
The equilibrium allocation of entrepreneurs, between producers and grabbers, is
determined by the relative proÞts of the two activities from (1) and (11).3 Both
proÞt functions πG and πP are increasing in the fraction of producers α. This is
illustrated in Figure 1, where the dashed curve represents a lower πG-curve. The
πG will be high relative to πP if i) the institutional quality λ is low, ii) the resource
rent R is high or iii) the number of entrepreneurs is low. In the following we assume
that the number of entrepreneurs and the proÞtability of modern production are
suﬃciently high to rule out the possibility of equilibria without a single producer.
Formally,
R
N
≤ π (0) (13)
3The model determines the endogenous variables α, nP , nG, y, s,π,πP ,πG as functions of the
exogenous variables and parameters. In the comparative statics exercises we focus on changes in
R,N, and λ.
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This condition states that some entrepreneurs Þnd it worthwhile to produce rather
than to grab, even in cases where institutions are completely grabber friendly. It
follows by inserting α = 0 and λ = 0 in the inequality πP ≥ πG.
Now the economy may be in one of the following two types of equilibria.
a) Production equilibrium, where all entrepreneurs are producers (πP ≥
πG and α = 1), is illustrated by point a in Figure 1. Total income is from
(7)
Y = Nπ (N) +R+ L (14)
b) Grabber equilibrium, where some entrepreneurs are producers and some are
grabbers (πP = πG and α ∈ (0, 1)), is illustrated by point b in Figure 1. In this
equilibrium it follows from (12) that the basic arbitrage equation πP = πG can be
expressed as
πG (1− λ) = π (αN) (15)
The left-hand side of (15) is the excess resource rents that a grabber has to give up
if he switches to become a producer. The right-hand side of (15) is the proÞt from
modern production that is the gain achieved by switching. It follows from (15) that
when proÞts in modern production is known, the proÞts in both activities follow.
Hence, total income can, by combining (15) and (6), be expressed as
Y =
N
1− λπ (αN) + L (16)
It follows from (12), since π > 0, that (i) when λ is high, or the resource rent R is
low, the only equilibrium is a production equilibrium4 and (ii) when λ is low, or the
resource rent R is large, the only equilibrium is a grabber equilibrium. Note that
(13) implies that the πP -curve starts out above the πG-curve. When πG is low the
economy is in the production equilibrium. When πG is high the economy is in the
grabber equilibrium. As the πG-curve crosses the πP -curve from below, the grabber
4Clearly, irrespective of R, entrepreneurs in a country with λ > 1 will never enter into grabbing.
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equilibrium is stable.5
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 More natural resources is a pure blessing in a production equilibrium
 a higher R raises national income. More natural resources is a curse in a grabber
equilibrium  a higher R lowers national income.
Proof. That national income goes up with R in the production equilibrium
follows directly from (14). The impact of higher R in the grabber equilibrium
follows by diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition πP = πG, obtaining
dα
dR
=
−z }| {µ
∂πP
∂R
− ∂πG
∂R
¶
µ
∂πG
∂α
− ∂πP
∂α
¶
| {z }
+
< 0
The sign of the numerator follows directly from the deÞnitions of πP and πG. The
sign of the denominator follows from (13) that assures that in equilibrium πG as a
function of α crosses πP from below (cf Figure 1). Knowing that α is decreasing in
R the proposition is immediate from (16).
The paradoxical result that more resources reduce total income needs further
elaboration. There are two opposing eﬀects: the immediate income eﬀect of a higher
R is a one to one increase in national income, the displacement eﬀect reduces national
income as entrepreneurs move from production to grabbing. The resource curse
paradox is that the displacement eﬀect is stronger than the immediate income eﬀect.
An entrepreneur who moves out of production forgoes the proÞt from modern
production π(nP ), but obtains an additional share of the resource rent equal to
(1 − λ)sR/N . In equilibrium (15) these two values are equal. With more nat-
ural resources the additional resource rents to grabbers obviously go up. Hence,
producers are induced to switch to grabbing until a new equilibrium is reached.
5In the Þgure we have drawn the functions as straight lines. This is a slight misrepresentation.
The true curves are both convex and may under special circumstances intersect twice. In that
case, only the Þrst intersection is a locally stable equilibrium. The propositions below are true also
for such a stable interior equilibrium.
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It is a well-known result from the rent-seeking literature that a Þxed opportunity
cost of grabbing implies that a marginal rise in rents is entirely dissipated by more
grabbing activities. Hence, the displacement eﬀect exactly balances the immediate
income eﬀect. In our case, however, the demand externality implies that the oppor-
tunity cost of grabbing π(nP ) declines as entrepreneurs switch from production to
grabbing. This externality magniÞes the displacement eﬀect and explains why the
displacement eﬀect is stronger than the immediate income eﬀect.
The extent of rent dissipation also depends on the quality of institutions:
Proposition 2 In the grabber equilibrium more producer friendly institutions
(higher values of λ) increase proÞts both in grabbing and production, and thus leads
to higher total income. When λ is close to one, the only equilibrium is the production
equilibrium.
Proof. The Þrst part is evident from (15). The last part follows from (11) which
shows that as λ increases to one, α eventually goes to 1 and πP > πG.
Interestingly, worse opportunities for grabbers raise their income. The reason is
that a higher value of λ induces entrepreneurs to shift from grabbing to production.
As a consequence, the national income goes up, raising the demand for modern com-
modities, and thereby raising producer proÞts even further. In the new equilibrium
proÞts from grabbing and from production are equalized at a higher level.
The extent of grabbing is also determined by the total number of entrepreneurs
as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In the grabber equilibrium an increase in the number of en-
trepreneurs N increases the number of producers (nP = αN) and lowers the number
of rent-seekers nG and increases proÞts in both activities.
Proof. By diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition πP = πG it follows that
dα
dN
=
+z }| {µ
∂πP
∂N
− ∂πG
∂N
¶
µ
∂πG
∂α
− ∂πP
∂α
¶
| {z }
+
> 0
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The sign of the numerator follows directly from the deÞnitions of πP and πG. The
sign of the denominator follows from (13) that assures that in equilibrium πG as
a function of α crosses πP from below (cf Figure 1). Hence, nP = αN increases
which together with (15) imply that the common level of proÞts in grabbing and
production must go up. Finally, it follows from (3) that πG = R/ (nG + λnP ) and
since nP and πG increase the number of grabbers nG must decline.
The proposition states that a higher number of entrepreneurs is a double bless-
ing. Not only do all new entrepreneurs go into production, but their entrance also
induces previous grabbers to shift over to production. The reason is the positive
externality in modern production. The proposition also states that grabbing is most
severe  both absolutely and relatively  in economies where the total number of
entrepreneurs is low. These results are important for the dynamics to which we now
turn.
3 Transition paths
The size of the modern sector depends on the number of entrepreneurs, the quality
of institutions and the level of resource abundance. From (1), (3) and (15) it follows
that in an grabber equilibrium
1− λ
(1− α) + λα
R
N
= π(αN) (17)
Equation (17) implicitly deÞnes the fraction of producers in the grabber equilibrium.
We denote this relationship by α = g (N,λ, R) which is increasing in N and λ,
but declining in R. When g (N,λ, R) is larger than one, however, we are in the
production equilibrium with α = 1. Hence, in general we have that
α = min (g (N,λ, R) , 1) (18)
When the amount of natural resources is above the threshold R∗ (deÞned by
g (N,λ, R∗) = 1) the economy is in the grabber equilibrium. Using (17) the threshold
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Figure 2: Resources and rent seeking
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R∗ can be expressed explicitly as
R∗ = N
λ
1− λπ(N) ≡ R
∗ (N,λ) (19)
The threshold level of resource abundance R∗ is an increasing function of N and λ.
When the resource abundance is less than R∗ the production equilibrium applies.
Formally we have the following:
R < R∗
R ≥ R∗
⇐⇒ α = 1
α ∈ (0, 1)
(production equilibrium)
(grabber equilibrium)
(20)
The growth of new entrepreneurs is a Þxed inßow θ of new entrepreneurs minus
the exit rate δ times the number of entrepreneurs N , expressed as dN/dt = θ− δN.
Here the long-run steady state level of entrepreneurs is equal to N¯ = θ/δ. Countries
that have little natural resources in the long run end up in a production equilibrium
as long as R ≤ R∗ ¡N¯,λ¢ from (19). This condition assures that the value of
resources is not suﬃciently high to make grabbing attractive when the total number
of entrepreneurs has reached its steady state level N¯ . Countries with more resources,
R > R∗
¡
N¯,λ
¢
, are in the long run not able to avoid the grabber equilibrium.
To see how the dynamics work consider Figure 2 where we measure the number
of productive entrepreneurs np on the horizontal axis and the value of resources
R on the vertical axis. Generally, (18) illustrated by the downward-sloping bold
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curve in Figure 2, represents the long run equilibrium number of producers. The
more natural resources, the lower the long run number of producers in a grabber
equilibrium. Rewriting (17), this long run relationship can be expressed by
R =
N¯
1− λπ(nP )− nPπ(nP ) (21)
In the Þgure we have also drawn iso-income curves. Each curve is downward
sloping as more natural resources are needed to keep the total income constant
when the number of producers declines. With a total income Y = Y , an iso-income
curve is given by
R = −W − nPπ(nP ) + Y (22)
By comparing this expression with (21) we see that the iso-income curves are steeper
than the long run equilibrium curve, as depicted in Figure 2.
We are now ready to illustrate the implications of resource abundance and in-
stitutions on income growth. We Þrst focus on two countries, A and B, that have
the same quality of institutions (the same λ) and by construction the same initial
income level. Country A has little resources, but a high number of producers, while
country B has more resources and fewer producers. Country A, that starts out in
point a, ends up in point a, while country B, that starts out in point b, ends up in
point b.
As seen from the Þgure the resource rich country B ends up at a lower income
level than the resource poor country A. The reason is that country A because of its
lack of resources, ends up in the production equilibrium, while country B because
of its resource abundance ends up in the grabber equilibrium. Accordingly, over the
transition period growth is lowest in the resource rich country. This is a speciÞc
example of a more general result. As is proved in Proposition 1, country B would
increase its growth potential if it had fewer resources.
Assume next that country B instead had more producer friendly institutions and
thus a higher λ than country A. As country B now is more immune to grabbing, it
can tolerate its resource abundance and still end up in the production equilibrium.
13
As a result, the long run equilibrium curve for country B shifts up, as illustrated by
the dotted curve in Figure 2. With grabber friendly institutions (low λ) country B
converges to point b, while with producer friendly institutions (high λ) country B
converges to point b. Income is higher in b than in b. Over the transition period
growth is therefore highest with producer friendly institutions. Moreover with more
producer friendly institutions the resource rich country B outperforms the resource
poor country A, eliminating the resource curse paradox.
4 Testing
Our main prediction is that the resource curse  that natural resource abundance
is harmful for economic development  only hits countries with grabber friendly
institutions. Thus countries with producer friendly institutions will not experience
any resource curse. Natural resource abundance does therefore hinder economic
growth in countries with grabber friendly institutions, but does not in countries
with producer friendly institutions.
This prediction challenges the Dutch disease explanation of the resource curse,
emphasized in the empirical work by Sachs and Warner (1995 and 1997a). They
dismiss one rent-seeking mechanism by showing that there is at most a weak impact
of resource abundance on institutional quality. Hence, resource abundance does not
cause a deterioration of institutions. They do not, however, consider our hypothesis
that a poor quality of institutions is the cause of the resource curse and that good
enough institutions can eliminate the resource curse entirely. If our hypothesis is
supported by the data, the role of institutions is conÞrmed and the Dutch disease
story is less palatable.
In order to test our hypothesis against Sachs and Warners we use their data
and methodology. All the data are from Sachs and Warner and are reproduced in
the appendix. For a complete description of the data sources we refer to Sachs and
Warner (1997b). Our sample consists of 87 countries, limited only by data avail-
ability. We use Sachs and Warners Journal of African Economies article (1997b)
rather than the Harvard mimeo (1997a). The reason is that the data series in the
Journal of African Economies article covers a longer period, covers a larger number
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of countries, and contains a more suitable measure of institutional quality. 6
The dependent variable is: GDP growth  average growth rate of real GDP per
capita between 1965 and 1990. Explanatory variables are: initial income level 
the log of GDP per head of the economically active population in 1965, openness
 an index of a countrys openness in the same period, resource abundance  the
share of primary exports in GNP in 1970, investments  the average ratio of real
gross domestic investments over GDP, and Þnally institutional quality  an index
ranging from zero to unity.
The institutional quality index is an unweighted average of Þve indexes based on
data from Political Risk Services: a rule of law index, a bureaucratic quality index,
a corruption in government index, a risk of expropriation index, and a government
repudiation of contracts index7. All these characteristics capture various aspects
of producer friendly versus grabber friendly institutions. The index runs from one
(maximum producer friendly institutions) to zero. Hence, when the index is zero,
there is a weak rule of law and a high risk of expropriation, malfunctioning bu-
reaucracy and corruption in the government; all of which favor grabbers and deter
producers.
Our Þrst regression conÞrms Sachs and Warners (1995 and 1997a) results on
convergence, openness, and natural resource abundance8. In regressions 2 and 3
we successively include institutional quality and investment share of GDP, which
both have a positive impact on growth. When investment is included, however,
institutional quality is no longer signiÞcant. This is possibly an indication that
institutional quality works via investments.
So far our estimates have added nothing beyond what Sachs and Warner showed.
Regression 4, however, provides the new insights to the understanding of the resource
curse. In this regression we include the interaction term that captures the essence
6The data used in both papers can be downloaded from Centre for International Development
at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
In the appendix we have reported our main regression using the data from (1997a). The results
diﬀer only marginally from the results reported below.
7A more detailed description of the index is provided by Knack and Keefer (1995).
8The minor diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients between our regression and Sachs and
Warners (1997a) are caused by diﬀerent starting years  ours is 1965, while theirs is 1970  and
that they exclude outliers. In the appendix we include regression results that exactly reproduce
Sachs and Warner (1997a) using their data and their rule of law measure as the indicator of
institutional quality.
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Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
initial income level
−0.79
(−3.80)∗
−1.02
(−4.38)∗
−1.28
(−6.65)∗
−1.26
(−6.70)∗
openness
3.06
(7.23)∗
2.49
(4.99)∗
1.45
(3.36)∗
1.66
(3.87)∗
resource abundance
−6.16
(−4.02)∗
−5.74
(−3.78)∗
−6.69
(−5.43)∗
−14.34
(−4.21)∗
institutional quality
2.2
(2.04)∗
0.6
(0.64)
−1.3
(−1.13)
[nvestments
0.15
(6.73)∗
0.16
(7.15)∗
interaction term
15.4
(2.40)∗
Observations 87 87 87 87
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.52 0.69 0.71
Note: The numbers in brackets are t-values. A star (*) indicates that the estimate is
signiÞcant at the 5-% level.
Table 1: Regression results. Dependent variable is GDP growth.
of our model prediction:
interaction term = [resource abundance] ∗ [institutional quality]
Our prediction is that the resource abundance is harmful to growth only when the
institutions are grabber friendly. Therefore we should expect that the interaction
term has a positive coeﬃcient. This is indeed what we Þnd. The eﬀect from the
interaction term is both strong and signiÞcant (with a p-value of .019).
Sachs and Warner (1997a and 2001) address the possible problem of reverse
causality between growth and the measure of natural resource abundance. They
Þnd no evidence of such problems. Their Þnding also applies in our case since we
use their methodology and variables. There may, however, be a problem with our
regression if the quality of the institutions itself is determined by the level of GDP.
This reverse causality problem is addressed in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001). They show, by using settler mortality as an instrument for institutional
quality, that the eﬀect of institutions on income becomes stronger. This indicates
that our estimate of the impact of institutions on growth, if anything, is too low.
Our results are also conÞrmed in the regressions contained in the appendix where
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we use exactly the same data set and include the same countries as Sachs and Warner
(1997). There we, as they did, use rule of law as an indicator of the institutional
quality.
The growth impact of a marginal increase in resources is by inserting from re-
gression 4
d [growth]
d [resource abundance]
= −14.34 + 15.40 [institutional quality] (23)
We see that the resource curse is weaker the higher the institutional quality.
Moreover, for countries with high institutional quality (higher than the threshold
14.34/15.40 = .93) the resource curse does not apply. As shown in the appendix, 15
of the 87 countries in our sample have the suﬃcient institutional quality to neutralize
the resource curse.
As mentioned in the introduction there are Þve countries that belong both to the
top eight according to their natural capital wealth and to the top 15 according to
per capita income. Of these countries United States, Canada, Norway and Australia
have an institutional quality above the threshold. The Þfth, Ireland, follows closely
with an index value of .83.
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that the quality of institutions determines whether countries avoid
the resource curse or not. The combination of grabber friendly institutions and
resource abundance produces a growth trap. Producer friendly institutions, however,
help countries to take full advantage of their natural resource abundance.
Dutch disease explanations of the curse emphasize how natural resources crowd
out growth generating traded goods production. If the Dutch disease story contained
the whole truth, it is diﬃcult to understand why the crowding out of the traded
goods sector should be so much stronger in countries with a certain institutional
quality. It is particularly hard to believe that Dutch disease policies are related
to the rule of law in any serious way. Using the rule of law as our measure of
institutional quality, as we have done in the appendix, conÞrms or results. We take
this as an indication that the Dutch disease mechanism does not explain the resource
17
curse. The explanation is rather found in a dangerous mix of grabber activities, bad
institutions, and resource abundance.
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1 Appendix
Regression results with Sachs and Warners (1997a) data.
In this appendix we report the regression result when we use the data that Sachs
and Warner (1997a) used. The Þrst column exactly replicates their result. The
second column reports our regression 4 with their data. Observe that rule of law
has taken the place as our indicator of institutional quality, both as a stand alone
variable and in the interaction term. When interpreting the results keep in mind
that the rule of law index runs from 0-6 while the institutional quality index runs
from 0 to 1.
Sachs and Warners regression Regression 4 (alternative)
[initial income level]
−1.76
(−8.56)∗
−1.82
(−8.96)∗
[openess]
1.33
(3.35)∗
1.53
(3.82)∗
[resource abundance]
−10.57
(−7.01)∗
−16.36
(−5.06)∗
[rule of law ]
0.36
(3.54)∗
0.18
(1.32)
[investments]
1.02
(3.45)∗
0.95
(3.28)∗
[interaction term]
1.96
(2.01)∗
Observations 71 71
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.74
Note: The numbers in brackets are t-values. A star (*) indicates that the estimate is
signiÞcant at the 5-% level.
Table 2: Regression results. Dependent variable is GDP growth.
The data are downloaded from Centre for International Development at
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. A short description of the data
are as follows (For a complete description consult Sachs and Warner 1997a):
initial income level  natural log of real GDP divided by the economically-active
population in 1970. GDP growth  average annual growth in real GDP divided
by the economically active population between 1970 and 1990. resource abundance
 share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970. openness  the frac-
tion of years during the period 1970-1990 in which the country is rated as an open
economy. investments  log of the ratio of real gross domestic investment (public
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plus private) to real GDP averaged over the period 1970-1989. rule of law  an
index constructed by the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector
which reßects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept
the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes.
Scores 0 (low) - 6 (high). Measured as of 1982. interaction  variable constructed
by multiplying rule of law with resource abundance.
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COUNTRY IQ LGDPEA SXP OPEN INV GDP6590
BOLIVIA 0.23 7.82 0.18 0.77 15.34 0.85
HAITI 0.26 7.40 0.08 0.00 6.64 -0.25
EL SALVADOR 0.26 8.15 0.16 0.04 8.19 0.19
BANGLADESH 0.27 7.68 0.01 0.00 3.13 0.76
GUATEMALA 0.28 8.16 0.11 0.12 9.19 0.71
GUYANA 0.28 8.06 0.51 0.12 20.23 -1.47
PHILIPPINES 0.30 7.78 0.13 0.12 16.50 1.39
UGANDA 0.30 7.10 0.27 0.12 2.52 -0.41
ZAIRE 0.30 6.93 0.15 0.00 5.20 -1.15
NICARAGUA 0.30 8.45 0.19 0.00 12.19 -2.24
MALI 0.30 6.71 0.08 0.12 5.89 0.82
SYRIA 0.31 8.37 0.08 0.04 15.31 2.65
NIGERIA 0.31 7.09 0.14 0.00 15.06 1.89
PERU 0.32 8.48 0.15 0.12 17.49 -0.56
HONDURAS 0.34 7.71 0.23 0.00 13.40 0.84
INDONESIA 0.37 6.99 0.11 0.81 21.57 4.74
CONGO 0.37 7.60 0.08 0.00 9.24 2.85
GHANA 0.37 7.45 0.21 0.23 5.05 0.07
SOMALIA 0.37 7.51 0.09 0.00 9.85 -0.98
JORDAN 0.41 8.04 0.09 1.00 16.80 2.43
PAKISTAN 0.41 7.49 0.03 0.00 9.57 1.76
ZAMBIA 0.41 7.66 0.54 0.00 15.98 -1.88
ARGENTINA 0.43 8.97 0.05 0.00 16.87 -0.25
MOROCCO 0.43 7.80 0.11 0.23 11.22 2.22
SRI LANKA 0.43 7.67 0.15 0.23 10.93 2.30
TOGO 0.44 6.82 0.19 0.00 18.35 1.07
EGYPT 0.44 7.58 0.07 0.00 5.13 2.51
ALGERIA 0.44 8.05 0.19 0.00 27.14 2.28
PARAGUAY 0.44 7.88 0.10 0.08 15.53 2.06
ZIMBABWE 0.44 7.58 0.17 0.00 14.87 0.86
MALAWI 0.45 6.68 0.21 0.00 11.29 0.92
DOMINICAN REP 0.45 7.85 0.13 0.00 17.75 2.12
TUNISIA 0.46 7.81 0.10 0.08 14.54 3.44
TANZANIA 0.46 6.58 0.17 0.00 11.60 1.93
MADAGASCAR 0.47 7.63 0.12 0.00 1.39 -1.99
JAMAICA 0.47 8.32 0.14 0.38 18.85 0.78
SENEGAL 0.48 7.69 0.14 0.00 5.11 -0.01
BURKINA FASO 0.48 6.52 0.04 0.00 9.49 1.26
URUGUAY 0.51 8.67 0.09 0.04 14.34 0.88
TURKEY 0.53 8.12 0.04 0.08 22.52 2.92
COLOMBIA 0.53 8.19 0.09 0.19 15.66 2.39
GABON 0.54 8.35 0.33 0.00 28.18 1.73
MEXICO 0.54 8.82 0.02 0.19 17.09 2.22
SIERRA LEONE 0.54 7.60 0.09 0.00 1.37 -0.83
ECUADOR 0.54 8.05 0.11 0.69 22.91 2.21
COSTA RICA 0.55 8.52 0.19 0.15 17.26 1.41
GREECE 0.55 8.45 0.04 1.00 24.57 3.17
VENEZUELA 0.56 9.60 0.24 0.08 22.16 -0.84
KENYA 0.56 7.14 0.18 0.12 14.52 1.61
GAMBIA 0.56 7.17 0.36 0.19 6.05 0.35
CAMEROON 0.57 7.10 0.18 0.00 10.59 2.40
CHINA 0.57 6.94 0.02 0.00 20.48 3.35
INDIA 0.58 7.21 0.02 0.00 14.19 2.03
NIGER 0.58 7.12 0.05 0.00 9.37 -0.69
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 0.61 9.39 0.08 0.00 13.10 0.76
ISRAEL 0.61 8.95 0.04 0.23 24.50 2.81
THAILAND 0.63 7.71 0.09 1.00 17.56 4.59
CHILE 0.63 8.69 0.15 0.58 18.18 1.13
BRAZIL 0.64 8.16 0.05 0.00 19.72 3.10
KOREA. REP. 0.64 7.58 0.02 0.88 26.97 7.41
IVORY COAST 0.67 7.89 0.29 0.00 10.06 -0.56
MALAYSIA 0.69 8.10 0.37 1.00 26.16 4.49
SOUTH AFRICA 0.69 8.48 0.17 0.00 18.53 0.85
BOTSWANA 0.70 7.10 0.05 0.42 24.61 5.71
SPAIN 0.76 8.87 0.03 1.00 25.05 2.95
PORTUGAL 0.77 8.25 0.05 1.00 22.99 4.54
HONG KONG 0.80 8.73 0.03 1.00 20.79 5.78
ITALY 0.82 9.07 0.02 1.00 25.90 3.15
TAIWAN 0.82 8.05 0.02 1.00 24.44 6.35
IRELAND 0.83 8.84 0.15 0.96 25.94 3.37
SINGAPORE 0.86 8.15 0.03 1.00 36.01 7.39
FRANCE 0.93 9.37 0.03 1.00 26.72 2.58
U.K. 0.93 9.38 0.03 1.00 18.12 2.18
JAPAN 0.94 8.79 0.01 1.00 34.36 4.66
AUSTRALIA 0.94 9.57 0.10 1.00 27.44 1.97
AUSTRIA 0.95 9.18 0.04 1.00 25.89 2.91
GERMANY. WEST 0.96 9.41 0.02 1.00 25.71 2.37
NORWAY 0.96 9.30 0.10 1.00 32.50 3.05
SWEDEN 0.97 9.56 0.05 1.00 22.38 1.80
NEW ZEALAND 0.97 9.63 0.18 0.19 23.79 0.97
CANADA 0.97 9.60 0.10 1.00 24.26 2.74
DENMARK 0.97 9.47 0.10 1.00 24.42 2.01
FINLAND 0.97 9.21 0.07 1.00 33.81 3.08
BELGIUM 0.97 9.27 0.11 1.00 22.26 2.70
U.S.A. 0.98 9.87 0.01 1.00 22.83 1.76
NETHERLANDS 0.98 9.38 0.15 1.00 23.32 2.27
SWITZERLAND 1.00 9.74 0.02 1.00 28.88 1.57
The variables are: IQ - an index of institutional quality,
LGDPEA - the log of GDP per head of the economically active population in 1965,
SXP - the share of primary exports in GNP in 1970, OPEN - an index of a countrys openness
INV - the average ratio of real gross domestic investments over GDP
GDP6590 average growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1965 and 1990
For more details see Sachs and Warner (1997a)
Table 3: Dataset used in the main regression.
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